约翰·罗伯茨会在弹劾审判中投决定性的一票吗？2020年1月29日，在DC首都华盛顿参议院弹劾美国总统唐纳德·特朗普的过程中，首席大法官约翰·罗伯茨在参议院电视直播中宣读了一名参议员的提问。参议员有16个小时向众议院经理和总统辩护小组提交书面问题。

在参议院弹劾唐纳德·特朗普总统的审判中，众议院管理人员赢得51票支持传唤证人的希望似乎几乎破灭了。

但是如果他们打成50比50的平局呢？在那种情况下，他们将保留微弱的获胜机会。但是前景是不确定的，一些可能的情况非常奇怪。

“说实话，我只是不知道结果会怎样，”弹劾历史学家弗兰克·鲍曼告诉记者新闻周刊在邮件里。密苏里大学法学院的教授鲍曼是重罪与轻罪:特朗普时代的弹劾史。

在票数相等的情况下，众议院经理们的最后希望是首席大法官约翰·罗伯茨投出一张支持他们的破平局的票。但是他能吗？他会吗？如果他真的这么做了呢？

以下是相关问题——以及专家对答案的最佳猜测。简单的回答是:这很复杂。

首席大法官小约翰·罗伯茨能在票数相等的情况下投票吗？

这是可能的。但是一些学者——比如弓箭手和前代理副检察长沃尔特·德林杰——相信他可能或者甚至可能拥有这种力量，其他人，比如加勒特·埃普斯巴尔的摩大学的，怀疑他有。除非罗伯茨认为他的角色让他别无选择，只能投下这样的一票，否则他似乎在性格上不太可能自愿卷入这场党派纷争。

这就是模糊之处。宪法明确规定(第一条，第三节，第四条)，副总统在担任参议院议长时，可以在众议院“平分秋色”时投票它还说(第一条，第三节，第六条)，当参议院正在进行一项关于美国总统的弹劾审判时——而不是，比如说，一个较低级别的联邦官员或联邦法官——美国首席大法官“将主持审判”大多数人认为，在这种情况下，宪法的制定者会用首席大法官来代替副总统，因为副总统——如果弹劾成功，将是下一个接任总统的人——会有巨大的利益冲突。

但是那些稀疏的句子给混乱留下了空间。对一些读者来说，首席大法官在主持参议院时，应该拥有与副总统在参议院立法会议上同样的权力，包括投一票的权力，这是理所当然的。但是宪法从来没有明确规定。由于宪法还规定(第一条，第二节)，参议院“将拥有审判所有弹劾案的唯一权力”，所以制宪者可能不想给首席大法官——而不是参议员——如此决定性的权力。所以还没有解决。

但是首席大法官萨蒙·蔡斯不是在1868年弹劾安德鲁·约翰逊的审判中投了几票吗？

他做到了。因此，如果首席大法官罗伯茨选择利用这一历史先例，这是有先例的。但是，根据爱尔兰共和军高曼的说法，他自学了参议院议会规则的奥术(他在1983年到1991年间是加州前共和党参议员皮特威尔逊的律师)，参议院本身并不认为蔡斯案是一个制度上的先例。那是因为没有参议员以正式的“程序问题”质疑蔡斯的投票

我以为参议院肯定蔡斯法官的选票。

这很复杂。在蔡斯的一次平局决胜投票后，他投下这些票的权力是受到挑战的——三次——由约翰逊审判中的某些参议员。每一次努力都失败了。例如，一名参议员提议修改规则，规定首席大法官“不是参议院成员，根据宪法无权在审判期间就任何问题投票”提议的修正案被否决了。然而，据高盛称，参议院本身并不认为这些失败的规则制定是有约束力的先例。

例如，1974年，参议院规则委员会起草了参议院规则委员会，预计对理查德·尼克松总统可能进行弹劾审判——由于尼克松辞职，该审判从未通过拟议的常设规则弹劾。在秘密会议具体的问题是首席大法官是否可以在平局决胜的情况下投票——尽管有1868年大通法官的先例。

无法达成共识。当时的参议院议员弗洛伊德·里迪克博士表示，《宪法》赋予首席法官这一权利。但是参议员罗伯特·伯德认为首席大法官应该只在程序性问题上投票(比如证据的可接受性)，而不应该在实质性问题上投票(比如定罪后是否取消被弹劾官员再次担任联邦职务的资格)。最后，委员会主席霍华德·坎农参议员坚持认为，首席大法官“在任何情况下”都不应该被允许投票，因为他不是“参议院成员”

最后，他们打住了，在现行规则中没有提到这个问题。这些提议的规则后来形成了现行常规于1986年通过。他们在这个问题上保持沉默。

现行规则难道没有赋予首席大法官自行传唤证人的权利吗？

这种观点是在1960年提出的纽约时报点评前代理副检察长、乔治敦大学法学教授和前共和党国会议员。作者集中讨论了《常设规则》第五条，该条规定首席法官——总统弹劾期间的首席法官——有权“独自”发布“所有命令”...由这些规则或参议院授权。”

高盛辩称，论坛版作者误解了这些规则。“规则五受规则六的约束，”他说，规则六解释说只有“参议院”有权“强迫证人出庭”他认为，任何其他阅读都毫无意义。他观察到，非总统弹劾案中的“主持官员”可以是任何一名临时参议员——甚至是一名低年级新生。这些规则不可能考虑给予那个人自己发出传票的权力。

这参议院报告因为1986年的常规似乎为高盛的观点提供了一些支持。它说规则五只是授权主持官员“发布参议院程序并执行参议院的规章和命令”——这听起来像是他在执行参议院的意愿，而不是取代他们的意愿。

如果首席大法官选择投票，参议院能否决他吗？

是的，但那时候事情会变得非常非常奇怪。这是因为投票结果——很可能是50比50——可能取决于问题的措辞。

“假设首席大法官打破了平局，”高盛说，投票支持传唤证人，完成了第一个场景。(记住，一般规则是需要多数票，所以联系会失去。高盛表示:“有人可以提出程序问题，‘首席大法官[’无权这样做。”。首席大法官裁定程序问题，发现他做有权投票。有人向参议院上诉首席大法官的裁决。然后提出了这样一个问题:“[首席大法官的裁决是否应该继续保持参议院的地位？”，即他有权投票在50比50的投票中，首席大法官的裁决将无法维持——即他无权投票——因此不会传唤证人。

但是在另一种情况下，同样的50-50票，证人能够被召唤。情况是这样的:当参议员反对酋长投票时，酋长不作出裁决，而是立即向参议院提出上诉。"那么问题是:程序问题处理得好吗？"高盛解释道。现在，在50对50的投票中，程序问题失败了，所以首席大法官的投票很重要。

理论上，我们甚至会发现自己处于无限倒退的境地。例如，在第一种情况下，在参议院以50比50投票决定是否维持首席大法官罗伯茨在程序问题上的裁决后，如果首席大法官也投票打破这一平局——让自己能够投票，又会怎样呢？接着。但是根据我们对罗伯茨的了解，这种情况实际上是不可想象的。

副总统没有投票权是绝对清楚的吗？

这引出了最后一个场景，最古怪的。高盛表示，这不是“荒谬”的可能性，尽管这可能是“荒谬的”

请记住，在弹劾安德鲁·约翰逊期间，没有现任副总统。(约翰逊曾是副总统，在林肯遇刺后升任总统，副总统职位空缺。)所以这个问题没有出现。

高盛说，随着比尔·克林顿弹劾审判的临近，副总统戈尔提出了以某种方式参与的可能性。但是伯德参议员告诉他不要。

然而，如果特朗普总统派副总统彭斯去参议院呢？在证人50-50票的情况下，彭斯可以以第一条第3款第6项为由投出打破平局的一票，从而抢先首席大法官投出关键一票的可能性。那么结果将取决于首席大法官是否允许彭斯投票，以及接下来的程序问题的措辞。

高盛表示，考虑到规则的不确定性和党派偏见的程度，最后一种情况将是“疯狂的，但并不令人愤慨”。

IS CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS THE TIEBREAKER IF THE SENATE TIES 50-50 ON WHETHER TO CALL IMPEACHMENT WITNESSES?

Will John Roberts cast the deciding vote in the impeachment trials? In this screengrab taken from a Senate Television webcast, Chief Justice John Roberts reads a question from a senator during impeachment proceedings against U.S. President Donald Trump in the Senate at the U.S. Capitol on January 29, 2020 in Washington, DC. Senators have 16 hours to submit written questions to the House managers and the President's defense team.

The House managers' hopes of winning 51 votes in favor of calling witnesses at the Senate impeachment trial of President Donald Trump seem all but dashed.

But what if they eke out a bare 50-50 tie? In that case, they would retain a reed-thin chance of prevailing. But the prospects are uncertain, and some possible scenarios are downright bizarre.

"To be honest, I just don't know how a tie would play out," impeachment historian Frank O. Bowman told Newsweek in an email. Bowman, a professor at the University of Missouri School of Law, is the author of High Crimes and Misdemeanors: A History of Impeachment for the Age of Trump.

On a tie vote, the House managers' last-gasp hope would be for Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr., to cast a tie-breaking vote in their favor. But can he? Would he? And what if he even did?

Here's are the relevant questions—and experts' best guess at the answers. The short answer is: it's complicated.

Can Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr., cast a vote in the event of a tie?

It's possible. But while some scholars—like Bowman and former Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger—believe he may or even probably has that power, others, like Garrett Epps of the University of Baltimore, doubt that he does. And unless Roberts thinks his role leaves him no choice but to cast such a vote, he seems temperamentally unlikely to thrust himself voluntarily into this partisan mess.

Here's the ambiguity. What the Constitution says explicitly (Article I, Section 3, Clause 4) is that the vice president, when sitting as president of the Senate, can cast a vote when the chamber is "equally divided." It also says (Article I, Section 3, Clause 6) that when the Senate is sitting in an impeachment trial concerning the president of the United States—as opposed to, say, a lesser federal officer or federal judge—the chief justice of the United States "shall preside." Most people assume the Framers of the Constitution substituted the chief justice for the vice president in that situation because the vice president—being next in line to assume the Presidency if the impeachment is successful—would have a colossal conflict of interest.

But those sparse sentences leave room for confusion. To some readers, it only stands to reason that the chief justice, when presiding over the Senate, should have the same powers that the vice president can exercise when the Senate sits in legislative session, including the power to cast a tie-breaking vote. But the Constitution never explicitly says that. And since the Constitution also says (Article I, Section 2) that the Senate "shall have the sole power to try all impeachments," it's possible that the Framers would not have wanted to give the chief justice—who is not a senator—such decisive power. So it's unresolved.

But didn't Chief Justice Salmon Chase cast several tie-breaking votes in the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson in 1868?

He did. So there is that historical precedent, if Chief Justice Roberts chooses to avail himself of it. But, according to Ira Goldman, who has schooled himself in the arcana of Senate Parliamentary rules (he was counsel to former Republican Senator Pete Wilson of California from 1983 to 1991), the Senate itself does not regard the Chase case as an institutional precedent. That's because no Senator challenged Chase's votes with a formal "point of order."

I thought the Senate affirmed Justice Chase's votes.

It's complicated. After one of Chase's tie-breaking votes, his authority to cast such votes was challenged—three times—by certain senators at the Johnson trial. Each effort failed. One senator proposed, for instance, a rule change that would have specified that the chief justice "is not a member of the Senate, and has no authority under the Constitution to vote on any question during the trial." The proposed amendment was defeated. Nevertheless, the Senate itself does not regard these failed rule-makings as binding precedents, according to Goldman.

In 1974, for instance, in anticipation of the possible impeachment trial of President Richard Nixon—one that, because of Nixon's resignation, never came to pass—the Senate Rules committee drafted proposed standing rules for impeachment. At an executive session the specific issue arose of whether the chief justice could vote in tie-break situations—notwithstanding the Justice Chase precedents of 1868.

A consensus could not be reached. The Senate Parliamentarian at the time, Dr. Floyd Riddick, expressed the view that the Constitution gave the chief justice that right. But Senator Robert Byrd thought the chief justice should vote only on procedural matters (like admissibility of evidence), and not on substantive questions (like whether, upon conviction, to disqualify the impeached officer from ever holding federal office again). Finally, the chairman of the committee, Senator Howard Cannon, insisted that the chief justice should not be permitted to vote "under any circumstances" because he was not a "member of the Senate."

In the end, they punted, omitting a reference to the issue in the standing rules. These proposed rules later formed the basis for the current standing rules, which were passed in 1986. They remain silent on that issue.

Don't the standing rules actually give the Chief Justice the right to subpoena witnesses on his own?

That view was advanced in a New York Times op-ed by a former Acting Solicitor General, a Georgetown Law professor, and a former Republican Congressman. The authors focused on Rule V of the standing rules, which says the presiding officer—the chief justice during a presidential impeachment—has the power "by himself" to issue "all orders ... authorized by these rules or by the Senate."

Goldman contends that the op-ed authors are misreading the rules. "Rule V is subject to Rule VI," he says, and Rule VI explains that it's only "the Senate" that has the power to "compel the attendance of witnesses." Any other reading makes little sense, he argues. The "presiding officer" in a non-presidential impeachment could be any senator filling in as President of the Senate pro tempore—even a lowly freshman, he observes. The rules could not have contemplated giving that one person, acting on his own, the power to issue subpoenas.

The Senate report for the 1986 standing rules seems to lend some support for Goldman's view. It says that Rule V simply authorizes the presiding officer "to issue Senate processes and to enforce Senate regulation and orders"—making it sound as thought he'd be carrying out the will of the Senate rather than substituting his for theirs.

If Chief Justice does choose to vote, can the Senate overrule him?

Yes, but that's when things could get really, really strange. That's because the outcome of the vote—likely to be 50-50, again—can depend on how the question is phrased.

"Say the chief justice breaks a tie," voting for witnesses to be subpoenaed, Goldman says, playing out the first scenario. (Remember, the general rule is that a majority vote is required, so ties lose.) "Someone can make a point of order: '[The chief justice] has no right to do that,'" Goldman says. The chief justice rules on the point of order, finding that he does have the right to vote. Someone appeals the chief justice's ruling to the Senate. The question is then posed: "Shall the ruling of the [chief justice]"—i.e., that he has the right to vote—"be sustained as the position of the Senate?" On a 50-50 vote, the chief justice's ruling would not be sustained—i.e., he has no right to cast the vote—and so no witnesses would be called.

But under another scenario, with the same 50-50 vote, the witnesses could be called. That scenario plays out this way: When a senator objects to the chief's casting of a vote, the chief makes no ruling and, instead, immediately submits the appeal to the Senate. "Then the question is: Is the point of order well taken?" Goldman explains. Now, on a 50-50 vote, the point of order fails, so the chief justice's vote counts.

Theoretically, we could even find ourselves in an infinite regress situation. For instance, in the first scenario, after the Senate votes 50-50 on whether to sustain chief justice Roberts' ruling on the point of order, what if the chief justice votes to break that tie, too—bootstrapping himself into being able to vote? And on it goes. But given what we know of Roberts, that scenario is virtually inconceivable.

Is it absolutely clear that the Vice President has no vote?

This brings up the last scenario, the wackiest of all. It's not an "absurd" possibility, Goldman says, though it might be "absurdist."

Remember that during the Andrew Johnson impeachment, there was no sitting vice president. (Johnson had been vice president and ascended to the presidency upon Lincoln's assassination, leaving the vice presidency vacant.) So this issue did not arise.

As the Bill Clinton impeachment trial approached, Goldman says, Vice President Al Gore raised the possibility of participating in some manner. But Sen. Byrd told him not to.

Still, what if President Trump sent Vice President Pence to the Senate floor? In the case of a 50-50 vote on witnesses, Pence could cast the tie-breaking vote—citing Article I, Section 3, Clause 6—preempting the possibility of the chief justice casting the critical vote. Then the outcome would depend on whether the chief justice permitted Pence's vote, and on the phrasing of the ensuing points of orders.

Given the uncertainties in the rules, and the level of partisanship in play, this last scenario would be "wild, but not outrageous," says Goldman.