据报道，美国和土耳其之间日益恶化的关系促使美国官员考虑从土耳其的一个重要空军基地撤走美国核武器，该基地距离该国与叙利亚的边境仅250英里。
土耳其南部的因瑟利克空军基地据信拥有大约50枚核弹头。这将是北约“核共享”概念所涉及的欧洲空军基地中最多的一个，这一概念将欧盟的核威慑扩展到整个欧洲大陆。
纽约时报援引两名匿名官员的话，周日报道称，美国国务院和能源部的工作人员正在审查重新安置核弹头的计划。一位未透露姓名的高级官员将这些武器描述为土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安的人质，并暗示移除这些武器将敲响北约两大军队联盟的丧钟。
因瑟利克靠近饱受战争蹂躏的叙利亚，这一点长期以来一直引发人们对该基地是否仍是美国核武器的合适东道国的讨论。此外，2016年针对埃尔多安的未遂政变引发了人们对土耳其国内局势的担忧太不稳定以确保核弹头等高价值资产的安全。
这些问题不再是美国规划者的首要问题。相反，美国官员不得不应对华盛顿和安卡拉之间的动荡关系，这种关系因两位强人领导人而加剧渴望展示肌肉在国际舞台上。
没有具体迹象表明美国正计划从因瑟利克撤走武器，尽管几周以来外交反复无常。
一名国务院官员告诉记者新闻周刊通过电子邮件，美国的政策是既不确认也不否认在任何一般或特定地点是否存在核武器。
皇家联合服务研究所的扩散和核政策主任汤姆·普朗特告诉记者新闻周刊如果美国武器离开因瑟利克，他会“真正感到惊讶”。
他指出，任何关于美国在土耳其核弹头的讨论都是在北约战略的大背景下进行的，土耳其现在是并将继续是北约战略的一个关键支柱。
普兰特说，从总体上说，最终在国外部署美国核武器表明华盛顿对某个特定国家感兴趣，并愿意保卫这个国家，或者至少保卫那里的武器。
开始重新部署武器将破坏这种关系，甚至可能破坏与比利时、意大利、荷兰和德国达成的同样协议，尤其是如果有协议的话游说反对它的团体。“你拉其中一根线，谁知道呢？事情开始分崩离析，”普兰特说。
从土耳其撤走核武器会让北约非常头疼。“我可以想象北约核计划者加班加点来解决这个问题，”普兰特指出。
“如果他们要搬家，将会有一些需要以某种方式解决的差距。联盟作为一个整体可以决定它可以容忍这一点，这是可能的。或者它可以决定以某种方式移动东西。”
特朗普的外交政策是不可预测的、本能的易变的。总统几次发表重要声明，只是后来才收回，甚至否认他说过。
如果做出任何从因瑟利克移除核武器的决定，这将更加困难。武器的敏感性意味着移动它们是一项长期的劳动密集型任务。
“这些事情涉及到很多后勤工作，部分是为了安全安排，”普兰特解释说。“只是安全地移动它们需要很多时间。这也需要土耳其人的合作——毕竟这是他们的领空，如果发生这种情况，这些东西很可能会被空运出去。”
普兰特补充说，这种宝贵而强大的武器将意味着移动它们“从根本上说是一个双方同意的过程”。任何关于因瑟利克的美国军队可能突然带着核弹头离开的说法都是不可行的。
如果拆除工作真的要发生——这仍然不太可能——工厂说它必须“有秩序地”进行。我认为这非常重要。”鉴于目前的紧张局势，这似乎还有一段路要走。“我目前没有看到的是这种关系中的大量秩序，”普兰特总结道。
这篇文章被更新以澄清汤姆·普朗特的评论。
2016年1月21日，土耳其因瑟利克空军基地，一辆标有“欢迎来到因瑟利克”字样的服务车被拍到。
U.S.-TURKEY TENSIONS RAISE FEARS OVER FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS NEAR SYRIA
The deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and Turkey has reportedly prompted U.S. officials to consider removing American nuclear weapons from a key air base in Turkey, just 250 miles from the country's border with Syria.
The Incirlik air base in southern Turkey is believed to host some 50 nuclear warheads. This would the most of any one European air base involved in NATO's "nuclear sharing" concept, which spreads the bloc's nuclear deterrent across the continent.
The New York Times—citing two anonymous officials—reported Sunday that State and Energy Department staff were reviewing plans to relocate the warheads. One unnamed senior described the weapons as hostages of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and suggested that their removal would sound the death knell of the alliance between NATO's two largest militaries.
Incirlik's proximity to war-torn Syria has long prompted discussions as to whether the base is still a suitable host for U.S. nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the failed coup against Erdogan in 2016 raised concerns that Turkey's domestic situation is too volatile to ensure the security of high-value assets like nuclear warheads.
These issues are no longer at the forefront for American planners. Instead, U.S. officials are having to contend with turbulent relations between Washington and Ankara, exacerbated by two strongman leaders keen to show muscle on the international stage.
There is no concrete indication that the U.S. is planning to remove its weapons from Incirlik, despite weeks of erratic diplomacy.
A State Department official told Newsweek by email that it was U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any general or specific location.
Tom Plant, the director of proliferation and nuclear policy at the Royal United Services Institute, told Newsweek he would be "genuinely surprised" if U.S. weapons left Incirlik.
He noted that any discussion of U.S. nuclear warheads in Turkey exists within the wider context of NATO strategy, of which Turkey is and will remain a key pillar.
Ultimately—and speaking in very general terms—deploying U.S. nuclear weapons abroad signals that Washington has an interest in a particular country and is willing to defend it, or at least the weapons placed there, Plant said.
To start redeploying weapons would upset this relationship, and could even undermine the same agreement made with Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany, especially if there are groups lobbying against it. "You pull one of these threads and who knows? Things start to unravel," Plant said.
Taking nuclear weapons out of Turkey would cause NATO a significant headache. "I could imagine NATO nuclear planners working overtime to work this one out," Plant noted.
"If they were to move, there would be some gap that would need to be addressed in some way. And the alliance as a whole could decide that it could tolerate that, that's possible as possible. Or it could decide to move things around in some way."
Trump's foreign policy is unpredictable, instinctive and changeable. Several times the president has made a major announcement only to walk it back later, or deny he even said it.
This would be much harder with any decision to remove nuclear weapons from Incirlik. The sensitivity of the weapons means that moving them is a long-term and labor intensive task.
"There's a lot of logistics involved in these things, in part for the security arrangements," Plant explained. "Just moving them safely would take a lot of time. And it would take the cooperation of the Turks as well—it's their airspace after all and these things will most likely be being flown out if that were to happen."
Such valuable and powerful weapons would mean that moving them "would be fundamentally a consensual process," Plant added. Any suggestion that the U.S. forces at Incirlik could suddenly up and leave with nuclear warheads is not feasible.
If the removal ever was to happen—which remains unlikely—Plant said it would have to be "in an orderly way. I think that's quite fundamental." Given current tensions, that seems some way off. "What I'm not seeing at the moment is a tremendous amount of order in that relationship," Plant concluded.
This article has been updated to clarify comments made by Tom Plant.
A service vehicle with a sign reading 'Welcome to Incirlik' is pictured at the air base in Incirlik, Turkey, on January 21, 2016.
