有几次错过的机会，以阻止大屠杀根据对执法反应的新评估，该评估提供了新的细节，并列出了警方处理上个月德克萨斯州乌瓦尔迪枪击案的方式的一些“关键问题”。
该报告的调查结果包括:一名配备步枪的乌瓦尔迪市警察在嫌疑枪手进入学校之前发现了他，并将其置于他的枪口下，但他等待主管的许可，给了嫌疑人进入学校的机会。
这名“军官没有听到(他的无线电)回应，于是转身向他的上司求证。当他回头对嫌犯讲话时，嫌犯已经在11:33:00进入西厅外门，”根据来自德克萨斯州立大学高级执法快速反应培训的评估。
“在这种情况下，[乌瓦尔迪]官员会听到枪声和/或枪声报告，并观察到一个人拿着一支步枪接近学校建筑，”评估称。“一个理智的官员会在这种情况下得出结论，基于所有的情况，使用致命武力是正当的。”
报告发现，如果这种情况，加上“事件前”失败中确定的其他两种情况，“以不同的方式解决”，他们就可以阻止随后的悲剧发生
报告指出的另一个问题是，第一个到达校园的警官没有看到停车场的嫌疑人，因为他正在“高速”驾驶。
“如果那名警官开得慢一点，或者把车停在学校的边缘，步行靠近，他可能会看到嫌疑人，并在嫌疑人进入大楼之前与他交火，”报告称。
包括19名儿童在内的21人在5月24日的袭击中丧生。
警方对枪击事件的反应受到了严密的审查，现在是多项调查的对象，因为有消息显示，警察在一个多小时内没有闯入枪手所在的教室。
史蒂文·麦克劳上校，州公共安全部主任，负责监督著名的德克萨斯骑警队，告诉德州参议院上个月那一天的执法工作是一次“彻底的失败”
最终，该报告发现，“如果他们接受了更快速的医疗护理，在这次事件中死亡的一些人可能会得救。”
该报告于周三由高级执法快速反应培训中心(ALERRT)发布，该中心被广泛认为是该国领先的现役射手和反应培训提供商。这项调查是由德克萨斯州最高执法机构公共安全部下令进行的，是基于调查机构提供的公共信息和证据，包括人体摄像机镜头和安全摄像机镜头，迄今为止一直保密。
除了McCraw的证词之外，有关调查的信息一直处于保密状态。
周三发布的新报告披露了事件时间表和警方反应的新细节，以及枪手进入教室后教室内的场景。
根据评估，在他进入学校32秒后，嫌疑人进入了111教室。“立刻，教室里可以听到孩子们的尖叫声和无数的枪声。射击速度最初非常快，然后慢下来，只持续了几秒钟，”评估说。
五秒钟后，嫌疑人走出教室，走到走廊，然后重新进入111室。
“嫌疑人随后再次进入似乎是111教室的地方，并在11:36:04(根据音频分析)之前继续发射估计超过100发子弹。在拍摄过程中，可以听到孩子们的尖叫和哭泣，”评估说。
总的来说，报告列出了枪手进入大楼前发生的三个关键问题，警方最初反应期间发生的三个关键问题，以及整个事件中发生的许多其他问题。
报告发现，就在枪手进入教室几分钟后，三名乌瓦尔迪警察局的警察带着防弹衣、两支步枪和三支手枪进入了大楼，几秒钟后，又有四名警察进入了另一个走廊。警察靠近大门，但被枪声击退，并后退寻找掩护，报告称，这一决定直接违背了广泛接受的主动射击训练，该训练要求执法人员立即应对威胁，即使这意味着警察不得不在没有防护装备的情况下开枪。
“保持位置，甚至推进到一个更好的位置，进行准确的回击，无疑是危险的，一些警察很有可能被枪杀，甚至被杀，”报告称。“然而，警察也很可能能够阻止袭击者，然后专注于立即对伤员进行医疗护理。”
“我们赞扬警察迅速进入大楼，并朝着枪声的方向前进，”报告称。“然而，当警察遭到枪击时，势头就丧失了。警察们撤退了，花了一个多小时才恢复势头，并接近了伤势严重的人。
报告还指出，当警察在学校走廊时，发生了多起枪击事件。乌瓦尔迪学区警察局长皮特·阿雷东多说，他认为这一事件从一个活跃的射手状态与设置路障的目标对峙，但报告发现，“在每一次[枪击]事件中，情况都变得活跃，应该启动立即行动计划，因为有理由相信有人被杀。”
Arredondo在被DPS确定为“事件指挥官”后承受了公众批评的压力，他在上周的一封信中辞去了在乌瓦尔迪市议会的职务。
无法进入教室，或“失去动力”，是该报告指出的发生在大楼内部的三个关键问题之一。另一个原因是教室的门从未锁上，这使得枪手可以自由进入教室。
尽管门没有上锁，但报告发现，最初在教室集合时，七名到达的官员“从未碰过门的任何部分”。自袭击发生后的第一天起，执法官员就表示，他们的反应因门锁而受阻。在一次书面采访中，Arredondo说，他在走廊里等着一名看门人带来几十把钥匙，他试图在邻近的教室门上寻找万能钥匙，但没有一把能用。最后，一个正常工作的人来了。
该报告还发现，在整个事件中，警察拥有大量工具，包括突破工具、盾牌、战术操作人员和CS气体，这些工具本应“增强警察的能力”。
该报告还发现了应对措施协调方面的多种问题，包括在走廊两端部署警察队伍。
“拥有多个团队或分裂现有团队会造成交叉火力局面，”报告称。“各小组应该迅速沟通，走廊一端的官员应该退出并重新部署到另一个位置。”
此外，该报告指出，响应团队应该由最多四个人组成，任何更多的人都可能“造成拥堵，并干扰团队快速有效地运作的能力。”
当大屠杀在教室内展开时，19名警官在走廊上。
Police officer missed chance to shoot Uvalde gunman by seeking permission, new assessment shows
There were several missed opportunities to stop themassacreat Robb Elementary School before it started, according to a new assessment of the law enforcement response, which provided new details and laid out a number of "key issues" with the way police handled the shooting in Uvalde, Texas, last month.
Among the report's findings: A Uvalde City Police officer armed with a rifle spotted the suspected shooter before he entered the school and had him in his gun sights, but he waited for permission from a supervisor, giving the suspect the chance to enter the school.
The "officer did not hear a response [on his radio] and turned to get confirmation from his supervisor. When he turned back to address the suspect, the suspect had already entered the west hall exterior door at 11:33:00," according to the assessment from Texas State University's Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training.
"In this instance, the [Uvalde] officer would have heard gunshots and/or reports of gunshots and observed an individual approaching the school building armed with a rifle," said the assessment. "A reasonable officer would conclude in this case, based upon the totality of the circumstances, that use of deadly force was warranted."
Had that situation, along with two others identified among the "pre incident" failures, "worked out differently," the report found, "they could have stopped the tragedy that followed."
Another problem noted by the report was the fact that the first officer to arrive on the school grounds was not able to see the suspect in the parking lot because he was driving at a "high rate of speed."
"If the officer had driven more slowly or had parked his car at the edge of the school property and approached on foot, he might have seen the suspect and been able to engage him before the suspect entered the building," the report said.
Twenty-one people, including 19 children, were killed in the May 24 attack.
The police response to the shooting has come under intense scrutiny and is now the subject of multiple investigations after it was revealed that officers did not breach the classroom containing the gunman for over an hour.
Col. Steven McCraw, the director of the state Department of Public Safety who oversees the famed Texas Rangers,told the Texas State Senatelast month that the law enforcement's work that day was an "abject failure."
Ultimately, the report found that "it is possible that some of the people who died during this event could have been saved if they had received more rapid medical care."
The report was released on Wednesday by the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center, which is widely recognized as the leading active shooter and respond training provider in the country. The investigation was ordered by Texas's top law-enforcement agency, the Department of Public Safety, was based on public information as well as evidence -- including body camera footage and security camera footage -- that was provided by investigative agencies and has so far been kept under wraps.
Outside of McCraw's testimony, information regarding the investigation has remained behind closed doors.
The new report released Wednesday reveals new details about the timeline of events and the police response, as well as the scene that unfolded inside the classrooms once the shooter entered.
Thirty-two seconds after he entered the school, the suspect entered classroom 111, according to the assessment. "Immediately, children's screams could be heard along with numerous gunshots in the classrooms. The rate of fire was initially very rapid then slowed, lasting only a few seconds," the assessment said.
Five seconds later, the suspect exited the classroom, stepped into the hallway and then reentered room 111.
"The suspect then re-enters what appears to be classroom 111 and continues to fire what is estimated to be over 100 rounds by 11:36:04 (according to audio analysis). During the shooting the sounds of children screaming, and crying, could be heard," the assessment said.
In total, the report listed three key issues that occurred before the shooter had entered the building, three key issues that occurred during the initial police response, and a number of other problems that occurred throughout the incident.
Just minutes after the gunman entered the classroom, three Uvalde Police Department officers entered the building equipped with body armor, two rifles, and three pistols, the report found, and seconds later, four more officers entered another hallway. The officers approached the door but were repelled by gunfire and fell back for cover, which the report said is a decision that directly contradicts widely-accepted active shooter training that mandates law enforcement immediately engage the threat, even if it means police have to take fire without protective gear.
"Maintaining position or even pushing forward to a better spot to deliver accurate return fire would have undoubtedly been dangerous, and there would have been a high probability that some of the officers would have been shot or even killed," the report said. "However, the officers also would likely have been able to stop the attacker and then focus on getting immediate medical care to the wounded."
"We commend the officers for quickly entering the building and moving toward the sounds of gunfire," said the report. "However, when the officers were fired at, momentum was lost. The officers fell back, and it took more than an hour to regain momentum and gain access to critically injured people.
The report also noted multiple instances of gunfire while officers were in the hallway of the school. Uvalde School District Police Chief Pete Arredondo has said he believed the incident hadtransitioned from an active shooter situationto a standoff with a barricaded subject, but the report found that the "during each of these instances [of gunfire], the situation had gone active, and the immediate action plan should have been triggered because it was reasonable to believe that people were being killed."
Arredondo, who has born the brunt of public criticism after he was identified by DPS as the "incident commander," resigned from his position on the Uvalde City Council in a letter last week.
The failure to enter the classroom, or "loss of momentum," was among the three key problems identified by the report that occurred inside the building. Another was that the door to the classroom had never been locked, which allowed the gunman to enter the classroom freely.
Even though the door was unlocked, the report found that the seven arriving officers "never touched any part of the doors" in the initial convergence on the classroom. Since the very first days after the attack, law enforcement officials have said their response was stymied by a locked door. In a print interview, Arredondo said he waited in the hallway as a janitor brought dozens of keys, which he tried on an adjacent classroom door in search of a master key -- but none worked. Eventually a working one arrived.
The report also found that throughout the incident, officers had a number of tools, including breaching tools, shields, tactical operators, and CS gas, that should have "increased the capabilities of the officers."
The report also found multiple issues with the coordination of the response, including posting teams of officers at both ends of the hallways.
"Having multiple teams or splitting an existing team can create a crossfire situation," the report said. "The teams should have quickly communicated, and officers at one end of the hallway should have backed out and redeployed to another position."
Additionally, the report noted that response teams should consist of up to four individuals, and any more can "create congestion and interfere with the ability of the team to operate quickly and effectively."
Nineteen officers were in the hallway as the massacre unfolded inside the classroom.
